Model City Charter Revision Project - Eighth Edition

Option Memo

Issue: Redistricting - Appointment of Commission

Seventh Edition: Section 6.02 (b) (1) currently states "There shall be a districting commission consisting of five members. No more than two commission members may belong to the same political party. The city council shall appoint four members. These four members shall, with the affirmative vote of at least three, choose the fifth member who shall be chairman."

Alternative Approach to Appointment of Commission: An alternative to council choosing the commission is to have sitting or retired judges choose the commission. The preceding Seventh Edition language could be modified to provide for this method. For example, the San Diego charter reads: "The Redistricting Commission shall be composed of seven (7) members who shall be appointed by the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court, San Diego Judicial District. In the event that the Presiding Judge declines to make the appointments, they shall be made by a Municipal Court Judge selected by vote of the Judges of the Municipal Court, San Diego Judicial District. Should the Judges of the Municipal Court decline to so act, then the Redistricting Commission shall be appointed by a panel of three retired Superior Court Judges drawn at random by the City Manager in the fashion described in Penal Code sections 900(a) and 902. In the event that all of the preceding individuals decline to act, then the Redistricting Commission shall be appointed by a majority vote of the City Council in the fashion set forth below."

Pros of Providing For Judges Choosing Redistricting Commission: A redistricting commission should be independent and should be perceived that way by the public. The Commentary currently states that "To avoid the conflict of interest created when council members must consider new districts whose lines may materially affect their political futures, the council can neither approve nor veto the result." While the council's potential for gerrymandering based on self-interest is limited substantially by the criteria in section 6.02 (d) in the Seventh Edition, the council nevertheless has the power to choose commission members who draw the districts. The conflict of interest logic applies to this situation, and the Eighth Edition should require that more neutral officials choose the commission, at least as a first choice. Retired judges are preferable to sitting judges because they are further removed from partisan considerations.

Cons of Judges Choosing Redistricting Commission: The Commentary to Seventh Edition argues that some cities find redistricting is politicized no matter who draws the map: "There are cities which prefer to have redistricting done by the city council either because of a belief that the redistricting process essentially involves a series of political decisions and that attempts to separate the process from the politics is futile and foolish or because redistricting in the past has been satisfactorily accomplished by the city council and that there is no need for change." It then goes on to provide an alternative set of provisions for cities where councilors draw the map. This suggests that the added step of finding sitting or retired judges to appoint the commission might not be worth the additional effort.

Options: The Committee should adopt one of the following positions by the end of the June 12 meeting:

1. The Model should continue to provide for an independent redistricting commission appointed by council.
2. The Model should provide for an independent redistricting commission appointed by municipal or superior court judges, either:
   1. sitting;
   2. retired; or,
   3. both, in a sequence to be decided on a city by city basis.
3. The Model should present (a) and (b) as options for cities to
   choose from.